Across industries, this paper finds that the rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC) is positively related to rates of entry and exit. This finding is consistent with industry dynamics along the balanced growth path of a general equilibrium, multi-industry model of the plant lifecycle, in which technology adoption is costly and the rate of ISTC varies across industries. Results are robust to allowing for structural change induced by technological progress. The model also generates lumpy investment as a result of technology adoption by incumbents.
Introduction
Entry and exit rates differ significantly across industries. Over the period 1963 -1982 , Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988 find that five-year entry rates in US manufacturing data range from 21% in Tobacco to 60% in Scientific Instruments. High-entry industries are high-exit industries, suggesting that there exist industryspecific factors that lead them to differ systematically in terms of overall turnover. At the same time, little is known about these factors.
This paper finds a strong, positive link between industry rates of entry and exit and the pace of technical progress in the capital goods that the industry usesthe rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC). 1 In addition, in countries in which the cost of entry is high, rates of entry and exit are suppressed in industries with high rates of ISTC, further indicating that ISTC is an important factor in the decision of whether (or when) to exit.
To the extent that a plant is locked into the vintage of capital that it uses, technological improvements in the production of capital goods may eventually drive the plant to obsolescence and hence closure. The paper formalizes this intuition in a general equilibrium model in which changing the vintage of capital used by a particular plant is costly. This vintage is referred to as a technology. In the model, an establishment is a technology-manager pair: the manager accumulates expertise with a given technology over time, and at any date may choose to upgrade to a newer technology -at the expense of accumulated expertise, as in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996) . The manager may also choose to close the plant at any point -opting instead to open a new one, or to work.
If the technology at a given plant falls behind the frontier for its industry, its profits decline, and this decline is more rapid when the rate of ISTC is high. However, if it is costly to return to the technological frontier, establishments may optimally choose to lag behind for a while. This allows ISTC to affect lifecycle dynamics, the timing of exit, and hence the rate of turnover. When only new establishments may implement new technologies, as in a prototypical vintage capital model, the industry rate of ISTC is analytically shown to cause a higher equilibrium rate of industry turnover. When incumbents too may adopt the frontier technology, in a calibration of the model to US data, ISTC accounts for a significant proportion of the observed cross-industry variation in entry and exit rates. In addition, entry costs disproportionately affect turnover in high ISTC industries, as in the data.
It is natural to address the link between turnover and ISTC in a vintage-type model. Indeed, the results confirm a basic prediction of this widely-used class of models. At the same time, an application of vintage capital models to the phenomenon of turnover must overcome two obstacles. First, it is not clear that entry and exit are essential for ISTC to occur as, in practice, incumbents regularly adopt new equipment. Allowing new technologies to be introduced only via entry embodies Schumpeter's assertion in the epigraph, and greatly increases model tractability: nonetheless, it is not clear under what conditions the predictions of a vintage model for turnover are robust to allowing incumbents to adopt new technologies too. Second, Bartelsman and Doms (2000) observe that, if entrants begin at the technological frontier, they should be both larger and more productive than incumbents, whereas it is well known that entrants are typically smaller than average.
The model overcomes these obstacles by allowing incumbents to update, and by distinguishing between the productivity of each plant and the quality of the capital that it uses. In this case, several mechanisms link turnover with ISTC. One (already mentioned) is obsolescence: the more rapidly a plant falls behind the industry frontier, the sooner it may cease to be economically profitable. Another is selection: in an environment with heterogeneous plants, the types of plants that close when they become obsolete (instead of updating) may depend on the rate of ISTC. In the calibrated model, the link between ISTC and turnover turns out to be mainly due to obsolescence. The selection effect is weak unless high rates of ISTC are also related to higher adoption costs -as in, for example, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) . Interestingly, more rapid ISTC turns out to increase selection pressures precisely when entrants are small relative to incumbents, so that hurdling the "obstacle" concerning entrant size turns out to strengthen the relationship between ISTC and turnover generated by obsolescence alone.
In addition, allowing incumbents to update generates "lumpy" investment at the establishment level well-known since Doms and Dunne (1998) . This pattern is typically modeled using non-convex capital adjustment costs, as in Khan and Thomas (2007) among others. In the current model, even though adjusting the quantity of capital itself is costless, the process of technology adoption itself generates this pattern -based on "technology adjustment costs". The model then predicts that industries that have higher rates of ISTC should display more "lumpy" investment -a prediction that turns out to be supported by the data.
As suggested by the epigraph, the sense that there should be a link between technical change and turnover goes back along way, and several papers do study such a link, including Mueller and Tilton (1969) , Geroski (1989) and Audretsch (1991) . However, those papers do not consider the rate of technical change as a determinant of long term industry differences in turnover and, in particular, none of them raises ISTC as an influence on lifecycle dynamics. 2 Campbell (1998) argues that ISTC may affect the cyclical behavior of aggregate entry and exit and finds that turnover and ISTC are positively related in a calibrated one-sector general equilibrium model, but neither paper attempts to account for long term cross-industry differences in turnover. Jovanovic and Tse (2006) develop a model in which new industries with a high rate of ISTC experience an earlier wave of capital replacement: however, that model does not distinguish between exit and updating.
The model extends the framework of Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) to allow for multiple industries and for technical progress. In a survey of entry and exit, Geroski (1995) reports little success in relating differences in turnover rates to industry characteristics, mostly measures of profitability or entry barriers. In a general equilibrium context in which entrepreneurs select their target industry, the model shows that there can be significant differences in equilibrium turnover rates (based on differences in lifecycle dynamics) even when there are no differences in profitability nor entry barriers across sectors. The model assumes a preference structure that leads to stable industry shares: however, an extension shows that the results are robust to allowing for structural change induced by technological progress itself, as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) .
Section 2 surveys the empirical relationship between entry, exit, and the rate of ISTC. Section 3 introduces the model, while Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium and Section 5 studies the relationship between ISTC and turnover in the model. Section 6 concludes by analyzing the role of entry costs in the model, as well as structural change and investment lumpiness. All proofs are in the Appendix.
ISTC and Turnover in the Data

Data
This section examines the relationship between turnover and ISTC in the data. First, these variables are indeed related in cross section. Second, a differences-in-differences approach exploits cross-country and cross-industry variation in entry and exit. See the Appendix for further details on the data.
Rates of entry, exit and turnover are drawn from the Eurostat database, which is provided by the European Commission. It includes all establishments in the business register for each of 18 countries over the period 1997 − 2004. Previous research on entry and exit mostly focuses on manufacturing data. Since manufacturing comprises less than half of GDP in industrialized economies, an advantage of the Eurostat data is that they also cover service and other industries, providing a more comprehensive view of entry and exit than most previous studies.
In what follows, the variable Entry is the proportion of establishments active at a given date t that entered since date t − 1, and the variable Exit is the number of establishments that closed between t − 1 and t, divided by the number of establishments active at date t. Both of these are averages over the sample period for each country-industry pair, to abstract from short term conditions. The variable T urnover is the sum of these two measures.
For cross-sectional comparisons, the industry index of entry, exit or turnover is based on the industry fixed effect in a regression of country and industry dummy variables. For example, if y j,c is entry in industry j in country c, consider the regression:
where I c and I j are country and industry indicator variables. The index of entry for industry j is then the coefficient α j , added to the coefficient α c for the median country. 3 Following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) and Cummins and Violante (2002) , the measure of ISTC is the inverse growth rate of the quality-adjusted relative price of capital used by each industry, as measured in the United States. To control for potential simultaneity or lags (see Appendix), the industry value is the average over the period 1987 − 1997, the decade prior to the entry and exit data. For robustness, we will also consider the average over the entire post-war period 1947 − 2000. The correlation between the two series is 91%, which supports the interpretation of the rate of ISTC as a long-term industry characteristic.
A potential difficulty relating technical change to turnover is the suggestion by Geroski (1989) that technical change may itself be a response to entry and exit, rather than a cause thereof, so that industries that experience high rates of turnover may generate a lot of innovation. This is unlikely to be true of investment-specific technical change, however. Industry ISTC measures are essentially weighted averages of ISTC measures for individual capital goods, where each good is used in many downstream industries. Hence, the rate of ISTC in a given type of capital good is unlikely to respond to conditions in any particular demanding industry. 4 In what follows, endogeneity is also addressed by measuring ISTC in the decade before the turnover measures.
The cross-country regressions below use two entry cost measures -from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) , and also from the World Bank (2006) . Each reports the cost of starting a business as a proportion of GDP per capita. The former is measured in the 1990s, and the latter over the following decade. They are denoted EC DLLS and EC W B respectively. The correlation between them is 68%. Another institutional variable used later as an instrument is legal origin, as reported in the CIA World Factbook. Table 1 presents the industry data. Entry and exit rates are highly correlated, suggesting that they largely reflect differences in long-term, within-industry turnover rather than simply short term phenomena or structural change. 5 Of the 153 possible country pairs in the database, 82% of the cross-country correlations in rates of Figure 1 : ISTC and Turnover. The rate of ISTC is the average rate of decline in the quality-adjusted price of capital used by each industry, computed using the procedure and data of Cummins and Violante (2002) . The rate of turnover is the industry fixed effect based on Eurostat data.
Results
Cross-section
turnover are significant at the 10% level, 76% at the 5% level and 63% at the 1% level. This indicates that there are systematic differences in entry and exit rates across industries, so that the lifecycles of establishments in a given industry in different countries may have common, possibly technological, determinants. Strikingly, Figure 1 and Tables 1 − 3 report that entry, exit and turnover are very highly correlated with ISTC across industries -on average, and also at the country level. The correlation between ISTC and turnover is about 50%, and the R 2 is around 25%. This is true of manufacturing industries (45% correlation) and also of non-manufacturing industries (56%).
Table 1 -Annual % rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC) and turnover. ISTC is the quality-adjusted price of capital goods (relative to non-durables) used by each industry in the US, 1987-1997. Entry, exit and turnover are industry fixed effects plus the median country fixed effect (Denmark), 1997-2004. Sources -Eurostat, Cummins and Violante (2002) and the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Entry
Exit ISTC Turnover 0.96 * * * 0.85 * * * 0.52 * * * (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Entry -0.67 * * * 0.48 * * * (0.000) (0.002) Exit --0.49 * * * (0.001) Table 2 -Correlations between turnover measures and ISTC. P-values are in parentheses. In all tables, one, two and three asterisks represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Country
Turnover Table 3 -Cross-industry correlations between ISTC and turnover, by country. The correlation between turnover and ISTC is significant in 16 of 18 cases.
Differences-in-differences
Research finds that the costs imposed by the regulation of entry vary significantly across countries. This suggests an indirect yet possibly powerful method for identifying the determinants of industry turnover, by exploiting cross-country differences in industry behavior and the regulation of entry.
Suppose that entry, exit, and technology adoption by incumbents all reflect profit maximizing choices made by entrepreneurs. For entrepreneurs, the opportunity cost of operating a particular plant includes the value of closing the plant and opening a new one. If the institutionally imposed cost of entry is high, this should increase the value of incumbency relative to new entry and, to the extent that exit can be delayed or avoided, may result in lower exit rates. This effect is termed obsolescence. In addition, to the extent that entry and exit reflect the introduction and replacement of technologies, entrepreneurs may avoid a high entry cost entirely by adopting new technologies at existing plants instead of exiting and (possibly) re-entering. This effect is termed selection. Hence, we might expect entry costs to reduce rates of exit disproportionately in industries in which the rate of ISTC is high. If a significant component of turnover reflects long-run factors, this should also be the case for rates of entry, and for overall turnover.
To test for these patterns, the differences-in-differences approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) is adopted. Let y j,c be entry, exit or turnover for industry j in country c. Let I c and I j denote country and industry indicator variables, respectively. IST C j measures the rate of ISTC in industry j, and EC c measures entry costs in country c. Then, estimate the equation:
If entry costs reduce establishment turnover primarily in industries where the rate of ISTC is high, then we would expect the coefficient β IST C on the interaction term between IST C j and EC c to be negative. By controlling for industry and country fixed effects, this should be the case regardless of other country-or industry-specific factors that might affect rates of turnover. 6
The maintained assumption is that the rate of ISTC (or the ranking) is an industry characteristic that persists across countries. IST C j is measured by computing the quality-adjusted price series for different types of capital, and creating an aggregate for each industry based on the weights of each good in the input-output tables. As a result, this assumption amounts to positing similar input-output tables across countries, and similar rates of technical progress in any given type of capital across countries. Since that the median rate of ISTC is about 4% per year, it is unlikely that significant differences in ISTC for the same industry across countries could be sustained for long in the absence of draconian import restrictions. 7 The coefficient on the interaction term between ISTC and entry costs is negative and significant -see Tables 4−5. This is regardless of whether turnover, entry or exit is the dependent variable in the regression. The fact that ISTC interacts with entry costs to generate differences in both entry and exit rates supports the notion that a significant portion of cross-industry differences in turnover represents a steady-state phenomenon. Repeating the regressions with ISTC measures from the entire postwar period yields much the same results, consistent with the hypothesis that ISTC is a long-run industry characteristic related to entry and exit rates. Results are also robust to the different measures of entry costs.
A potential concern in this context is policy endogeneity: it could be that entry costs vary across countries in a way that depends systematically upon patterns of entry and exit, exogenously determined. For instance, if for some reason establishment turnover rates across industries are compressed (so there are fewer firms experiencing very high rates of expected turnover), this may allow incumbents to lobby more effectively for the imposition of higher entry costs to discourage competition. A common instrument to control for this possibility is legal origin, see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) . The results when entry costs are instrumented using legal origin are even stronger in many cases: the interaction terms remain statistically significant and increase in magnitude. Table 4 -Effect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and institutional entry costs, as measured by Djankov et al (2002) . Country and industry fixed effects are omitted for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
Table 5 -Effect on turnover of the interaction between ISTC and institutional entry costs, as measured by World Bank (2006) . Country and industry fixed effects are omitted for brevity. P-values are reported in parentheses, and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White procedure.
It is interesting to check the robustness -or generality -of the results by seeing whether they hold if manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries are treated separately. While results are weaker in the smaller samples, the sign and significance of β IST C persists. Another question is whether these results apply only to the smallest establishments, or whether it is an industry-wide phenomenon. Entry, exit and turnover rates are recomputed using only establishments with 0-4, 1-4 or 1-9 employees. The sign of β IST C remains negative but is only significant when the entry cost measure of World Bank (2006) is used, although the Djankov et al (2002) measure is also significant in the instrumental variables regressions. Thus, it is not the case that the results are purely driven by churn at the bottom of the size distribution. That results are weaker when only looking at small establishments is consistent with evidence that small firms are particularly sensitive to short term macroeconomic conditions, as in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) for example, which would cloud the effects of long-term factors on their lifecycle dynamics.
Both ISTC and entry costs are normalized by their means and standard errors. Hence, regression coefficients can be interpreted as follows. According to the Djankov et al (2002) measure of institutional entry costs, Sweden and Italy occupy the 25th and 75th percentiles respectively. In terms of industry ISTC, the 25th percentile is occupied by Transportation Equipment, whereas the 75th percentile is occupied by Retail Trade. In the median country, if entry costs were to drop from the level of Italy to the level of Sweden, the annual rate of turnover would converge between transportation equipment and retail trade by 0.3%, according to the instrumental variables regression.
The difference in annual industry turnover between the 25th and 75th percentiles is 2.9%. Thus, the magnitude of the interaction between entry costs and ISTC is an order below the magnitude of cross-industry variation in rates of entry and exit. This suggests that the ranking of industries according to turnover should not differ significantly across countries in spite of the interaction between entry costs and ISTC -as reported earlier in this section.
Economic Environment
Overview
There is a continuum of plants of endogenous mass that live in discrete time, populating J > 1 industries. Time is indexed by t and the length of time between periods is ∆, so that t ∈ {0, ∆, 2∆, 3∆, ...}. 8 A plant is a technology, implemented by a manager/entrepreneur with a degree of success that is stochastic yet persistent.
In the model, a technology is a level of investment-specific technical change. There is a capital sector that converts the aggregate good into capital goods. The efficiency of capital production differs by industry and varies across technologies. 9 To change the vintage of their technology, plants must update it: updating, however, may decrease their expertise, part of which is vintage-specific. Also, at any point, the manager may choose to close the plant if the payoff from her outside option exceeds that of continuation. As a result, plants may find it optimal to be temporarily "locked" into a particular technology, investing in capital of a type that is not at the industry frontier, and eventually updating or exiting depending on the efficiency of implementation.
Households and investment
There is an aggregate good y t which is the composite of the output of the J industries:
It can be used for consumption c t or for investment i j xt in capital goods for any industry j of type x. The stock of each type of capital evolves according to
so that capital depreciates by a factor ¡ 1 − e −δ∆ ¢ each period. Thus, at any date, one unit of foregone consumption may be converted into x units of capital of type x in any industry j. There is a frontier level of x which varies by industry, denoted x j t . It changes over time at rate g j , so thatx j t =x j 0 e −g j t . Parameter g j is the rate of investment-specific technical change experienced by industry j.
Preferences over consumption are
The rate of time preference is ρ. 1/κ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Each household begins period t with k j xt units of capital of each type (x, j). Each type commands a rental rate ∆r j xt . A household is also endowed with one unit of labor each period, which may be used to earn a wage ∆w t or used in entrepreneurship. Households earn income by renting capital and labor to establishments, and by earning profits π t from the establishment it owns if the agent is an entrepreneur.
Their budget constraint is
where l t is time spent working. Agents select consumption, investment and labor allocations so as to maximize (4), subject to (5).
Production
Each plant is characterized by a technology x, and the manager's success in implementing it z t . Variables z t and x define the plant, and may not be traded. 10 The plant's production function is
where k t is the quantity of efficiency units of capital that it uses, and n t is labor.
A jt = A j0 e ς j t is a measure of disembodied technology. Thus, g j is the industry rate of investment-specific technical change (ISTC), and ς j is the industry rate of disembodied technical change (DTC). Let p jt be the competitive price of good j. The plant's profits in period t are
Thus, although x does not enter into the production function, it affects profits because it is the rate at which the economy can produce the capital goods that the establishment uses, which is reflected in the equilibrium rental rate of capital ∆r j xt .
In equilibrium, more efficient technologies will be associated with cheaper capital, providing an incentive to use the frontier technology caeteris paribus. However, technology adoption is costly. At the end of any period, the establishment may choose to update its technology x to the frontier, at the cost of a proportion ζ l < 1 of its expertise z t . Thus, some accumulated knowledge may no longer apply to the new technology.
Finally, establishments face a stochastic learning ladder, which they may climb or descend. With probability ¡ 1 − e −∆η ¢ , they may obtain a new level of productivity
Otherwise, with probability e −∆η , z t+1 = z t . Thus, if a firm adopts a new technology its expertise the following period is z t+1 = ζ l z t unless it receives a new draw from f , in which case its productivity the following period is drawn from the distribution
f may be interpreted as a stochastic learning process.
Some authors have argued that the rate of ISTC is positively related to adoption costs, 11 which suggests that the adoption cost parameter ζ l may be a function of g j . Allow ζ l = ζ l (g j ) , where ζ 0 l (·) ≤ 0, so that the numerical experiments can assess whether this relationship is important for model behavior.
Entry and Exit
Agents in this environment may either work, or create and operate up toc > 0 plants. Creating a plant requires a delay of length d, after which profits begin to flow. Let E = 1 − e −ρd . E is the cost of entry. This formulation captures the finding of Djankov et al (2002) that cross-country variation in entry costs largely takes the form of bureaucratic delays.
Establishments start their lives with a value of z t drawn from a common distribution ψ, and with the frontier technology. At any point in time, the entrepreneur may close the establishment, earning a continuation payoff W t to be discussed in more detail below. Once born, establishments also close exogenously with probability ∆χ each period, in which case the entrepreneur may return to work in any industry, or open another plant. That entrepreneurs are not tied to any particular industry and move in and out of the labor market is consistent with the behavior documented by Lazear (2005).
In equilibrium, entrepreneurialism in any sector experiencing entry must carry the same expected benefit as labor. The return from operating an establishment is stochastic: however, assuming complete insurance markets, there is no income uncertainty for individual agents. Hence, in equilibrium,
Let ε j t be the mass of entrants at date t. If in equilibrium there is entry into any two sectors j and j 0 , then it must be that
In equilibrium, prices p jt are such that this free entry condition is satisfied with equality.
If agents participate in the labor force, they earn a flow of income w t . Expected lifetime income from labor is then
where i (t) is the interest rate at date t.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium decision rules imply a law of motion for the measure μ j t+1 = Γ j ¡ μ j
.
Definition 1 Industry rates of entry and exit are:
Definition 2 A stationary equilibrium (balanced growth path, or BGP) is a measure μ j * for each industry, a mass of entrants ε j * and prices © p * jt ª ∞ t=0 such that the labor market clears, the measure replicates itself, all households maximize (4) subject to (5) given prices and expectations, and aggregate output y t grows at a constant rate.
This definition is similar to that in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) except that the model distinguishes between industries. Also, because rates of investment-specific and disembodied technical change differ across industries, relative prices will diverge even along a balanced growth path (as in , for example).
Proposition 1 There exists a balanced growth path with positive, constant rates of entry and exit into all sectors.
The proof of the proposition derives from a series of conditions that are then shown to be consistent with equilibrium. First, for profitability to be proportional across industries requires prices to grow at a pace inversely linked to rates of ISTC and disembodied technical change. Specifically, along a BGP,
This implies that the decision problem of the establishment is stationary. The measure of establishments in a given subset of the type space is constant over time which, in combination with the decision variables, enables an expression for μ j t -net of a constant Q. Finally, for a given wage, product prices and demand are given. The proof shows that there is a unique constant Q that clears the labor market.
Proposition 2 At any date, the rental rate of capital is decreasing in the vintage, at a rate that is proportional to g j .
This result is central to the establishment dynamics of the model. Establishments using more advanced capital benefit through cheaper capital services than their competitors. On the other hand, the fact that updating to the frontier is costly implies that establishments gradually fall away from the frontier, whereas some of their competitors -either because they just updated or because they are recent entrants -may use more advanced capital than they do. The price of output declines along with the cost of production across the industry, whereas any given establishment only benefits from decreased costs if it decides to update -which may not be optimal in every period. As a result, g j introduces a downward trend in the marginal revenue product of the establishment over time, net of other aspects of establishment dynamics.
This also suggests that rates of entry and exit may not be related to the industry rate of disembodied technological progress ς j , since it is not costly to adjust. Again, the price of the output of industry j is driven by the dynamics of the industry as a whole, implying that the price of output declines at a rate that offsets ς j . However, since all establishments are at the frontier with respect to disembodied technical progress, this has no influence on their lifecycle decisions.
Lemma 1 On a balanced growth path, an establishment's updating and exit decisions depend only upon parameters indexed by industry j and the age of technology a, not the date.
At any date, the value of an establishment may be written recursively, and rewritten in terms of the technology's age a instead of the level of ISTC x. Solving for optimal input use, the lemma shows that the establishment's updating and exit behavior is the solution to the problem:
where T is the planned point in time at which the technology becomes obsolete. Π j represents profits up until that point,
while U j is the value of updating and W j is the value of exit:
Let T * (∆) be the solution to the problem in equation (15) of when to update or exit.
Notice that prices do not enter problem (15), as suggested by the earlier discussion. A crucial reason for this is that the value to an entrepreneur of closing an establishment is equal to the opportunity cost of entering other industries and, by optimal sectorial choice, that this in turn is equal to the value of re-entering the same industry. It is not necessary that the entrepreneur be able to re-enter the same industry, only that other entrepreneurs have a choice over which industry to enter.
Let Υ * ∈ {0, 1} equal one if the plant optimally updates, and let X * ∈ {0, 1} equal one if the plant optimally exits. We are interested in which firm-and industryspecific parameters affect these rules.
Lemma 2
The optimal updating strategy Υ * is an (S, s) policy, censored by the exit rule X * , where X * is decreasing in z t .
Equilibrium lifecycle dynamics are as follows. The plant is born, and climbs a (stochastic) productivity ladder while simultaneously falling behind the technological frontier. Eventually, learning is sufficiently offset by price declines due to technical progress at the industry level that the plant shrinks until it either updates or -if z is sufficiently low -closes.
Lemma 3 T * , Υ * and X * are contingent upon z t and on g j , but not ω j , A j0 , nor ς j .
It follows from Lemma 3 and from the fact that equilibrium spending shares on each type of good j are constant that:
Proposition 3 On a BGP, entry and exit rules depend on g j , but do not depend on ω j (preferences), on A j0 , nor on ς j .
ISTC and Turnover in the Model
This section has several objectives. In a simple version of the model, equilibrium entry and exit rates are proven to be positively related to g j . This result also holds in a calibration of the general model to US data. In addition, plants in the calibrated model turn out to display investment spikes when they update, and the presence these spikes is also positively linked to g j .
Entry and exit in a typical vintage capital model
To characterize the impact of ISTC on the timing of exit, assume for now that:
Assumption 1 z l = z h , and ζ l = 0.
Under Assumption 1, there is no learning and no updating. As in a typical vintage capital model, only entrants have access to the frontier technology and, absent any variation in z t , they are larger than incumbents. This focuses the model on when, rather than whether, to exit. Also, let ∆ → 0 so, in the limit, the updating rule T * (0) = lim ∆→0 T * (∆) is a continuous function of parameters.
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 1, T (0) is strictly decreasing in g j , and rates of entry and exit are strictly increasing in g j .
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, rates of entry and exit are strictly increasing in the rate of decline of the relative price of capital experienced by each industry.
Two effects impact whether high g j involves earlier exit. Establishments fall behind the frontier at a rate that depends on g j , which encourages earlier exit. On the other hand, a high value of g j also lowers the profits from re-entry, which discourages exit. The proof shows that the first effect dominates the second. 12 The example above clarifies the dynamics introduced by ISTC, by abstracting from other aspects of establishment lifecycle dynamics. In particular, under Assumption 1, plants shrink until they exit. David Evans (1987a) does find that exiting establishments tend to shrink in the periods before exit. However, surviving establishments tend to grow over time, something from which the example abstracts. To assess whether these results are robust to allowing for other dynamics requires a calibration of the model, to be presented next.
The model with updating
Returning to the general model without Assumption 1, where z l ≤ z h , and ζ l ≥ 0, suppose ∆ → 0. Now, establishments in industry i solve the problem:
Industries with a high capital share should also experience more entry and exit, something that is consistent with the results of Audretsch (1991) . This is because the rate at which a plant's profitability falls behind the frontier is
The analogue of Proposition 4 can no longer be proven analytically. Still, two additional channels may affect the industry rate of entry and exit. First, if plants may update and may differ in terms of z t , the set of establishments that exit may depend on g j . The impact of this selection effect on turnover is ambiguous, and depends on the following condition. Establishments will exit (instead of updating
If dz * dg > 0, then higher rates of ISTC are associated with a larger set of establishments exiting. z * is endogenous and depends on ψ, so z * cannot be derived analytically. However, taking the total derivative of (19) with respect to g j ,
It is straightforward to show that V j z (0, z * ζ l ) > 0, and that V j g is negative and larger in magnitude for larger z. 13 Thus, a higher value of g j leads to plants with a broader set of productivity values exiting ³ dz * dg > 0´provided that z * is "large" relative to the shock values drawn by entrants. This dovetails nicely with the fact that low initial shock values are a natural feature of many models that wish to match the higher exit rates among entrants documented by Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) among others.
Second, there will also be a threshold z * * such that establishments drawing z ≤ z * * exit as soon as their shock value is revealed. z * * is given by
Clearly z * * = z * ζ l so that, once more, dz * * dg > 0 provided that z * * is "large" relative to the shock values drawn by entrants -and, since dz * * dg = ζ l dz * dg the two derivatives always share the same sign. Thus, depending on the form of ψ, higher rates of ISTC may also induce stronger selection among firms, so that a larger proportion of the type space exits instead of updating once its technology has become obsolete.
Calibration
The model is now calibrated to US industry and macroeconomic data. Detailed data on industry dynamics are mostly available only for the manufacturing sector. Hence, the model is calibrated for a "typical" manufacturing industry, by assuming that g j takes the median value for the manufacturing industry (the median and the mean are both about 4%), and choosing the remaining parameters so that this industry behaves as the manufacturing sector does on average. Varying g j while keeping other parameters constant then indicates how much of cross-industry turnover differences is attributed by the model to cross-industry variation in g j .
Period length is one year, and ∆ = 1. Let η = 1. z is drawn from a grid of 100 points, where z ∈ [0, 1].
Computing industry exit rates requires calibrating the distribution ψ of entrant productivity and the process f that changes productivity thereafter. ψ is modeled as a log normal distribution truncated at the end points, with mean μ ψ and standard error σ ψ . f is modeled as a stochastic learning process, following the interpretation of Dunne et al (1989) of the fact that firms tend to grow faster early in life. Assume that
where the disturbances ε t+1 are normal with mean zero and standard deviation σ ε , but the distribution is truncated so that z t ∈ [0, 1] ∀t. 14 To calibrate the model requires values for μ ψ , σ ψ , ν, σ ε , ζ l , η, χ, E and ρ. Some of these parameters can be mapped into the model directly from the data:
1. α k and α n are chosen as follows. A value of α n = 63% lies in the mid-range of estimates of the labor share. As for α k , the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports that income from equity and proprietorships has averaged 12% of GDP since the 1950s. Identifying this with 1 − (α k + α n ) yields α k = 25%.
2. ρ is the rate of time preference, which is related to the equilibrium return on capital. use a value of 7%. The US NIPA report economic growth of 2.2% per year over the post-war period, implying that ρ = 4.5%.
14 To see how this is a learning process, consider this formulation:
where ε t+1 is drawn from a normal distribution, truncated so as to keep z t+1 ≤ 1. The extent to which firms are likely to increase is lower depending on their size. If ν < 1 then firms will be drawn towards z = 1, which is the upper bound.
3. Waddell, Ritz, Norton and Wood (1966) report that it takes about a year to set up a plant in most industries. As for institutional entry costs, Djankov et al (2002) report that the formal cost of entry is under 1% of GDP for the US. Hence, d = 1, so E = 1 − e −ρ . One year is also the time-to-build assumed in Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Campbell (1998) . Table 6 -Calibration parameters
The remaining parameters are matched so that the behavior of industry growth rates is similar to a typical manufacturing industry, using simulated annealing -see Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1992) . These six parameters are μ ψ , σ ψ , ζ l , ν, σ ε , and χ. The six statistics to be matched are:
1. the exit rate among the young (establishments aged 0-5 years), as reported in Brown, Haltiwanger and Lane (2006) .
2. the average growth rate -from Evans (1987a) .
3. the average growth rate among the young -from Evans (1987a). 4. the "lumpiness" of investment. Doms and Dunne (1998) report that the share of plants experiencing an increase in the capital stock of 30% or higher is 6%. 15 This requires the model to fit not just the mean and standard deviation of growth rates but also the skewness of the growth rate distribution. As discussed later, lumpiness in the model is related to the frequency of updating by incumbents.
5. the log standard deviation of growth rates -from Evans (1987b).
6. the average exit rate (Brown et al (2006)). Table 6 reports the resulting parameters, and Table 7 the model statistics. The matches are generally quite tight. Interestingly, average size among entrants is only 2/3 of the average size among all plants. This is in spite of the fact that entrants adopt the frontier technology, as in a canonical vintage capital model. The average updating lag is 5.4 years, so that the "updating rate" (conditional on not exiting) is about the same as the exit rate.
In the model, the exogenous exit rate is χ = 8.9%. Thus, annual turnover of about 4% is endogenous and due to ISTC, the remainder being attributed to factors that are not modeled explicitly. This implies that industry exit rates must be greater than or equal to 8.9% in the model. The minimum long term industry exit rate in the data (as measured by the minimum industry turnover rate divided by two) is very close, at 8.7%. 
Statistic
Results
Entry, exit and ISTC
We wish to see first of all whether g j is positively related to entry and exit in the calibrated model, which allows for updating as well as entry as a means of technology adoption. If so, to what extent can the model account for cross-industry variation in rates of entry and exit? Entry and exit rates are positively related to g j in the model. Cummins and Violante (2002) report rates of ISTC ranging from 1% to 8% across industries. In the model, this generates a range of entry rates from 11.8% to 13.4% per year. Thus, even though most firms are in fact growing in the calibrated economy, and although incumbents have the option to update instead of exiting, a higher rate of ISTC nonetheless increases industry turnover. In the data entry rates range from 8.7% to 17.1%, so the model covers about 20% of the range. This is similar to the R 2 of the regressions between ISTC and turnover.
Adjustment costs and ISTC
Several authors have pointed out that higher rates of ISTC are likely to be related to higher adoption costs. In a one-sector general equilibrium model, finds that allowing adoption costs to respond to the rate of ISTC can be important for its impact on technology adoption decisions. Hence, allow ζ l = ζ l (g j ), ζ 0 l ≤ 0. Henceforth set ζ l (g j ) =ζ + θg j , where for a given value of θ the value ofζ is chosen so that ζ l (g j ) equals the benchmark value for the median g j . Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) find that investments in information technology had a rate of return of about 2000% in the late 1990s, interpreting this as an indicator Figure 3 : Decision rules for different rates of ISTC g j and different values of the adoption cost parameter θ. The exit threshold z * is visibly more sensitive to changes in g j when θ is high, whereas the date of updating or exit T * is more sensitive to g j when θ is low.
of unmeasured adoption costs. When θ = 8 the difference between adoption costs in an economy with g j = 0.01 and one with g j = 0.08 is a factor of 5. Considering that information technology comprises over half of measured capital investment in the US suggests that θ ∈ [0, 10] covers the empirically relevant range.
Since adoption costs discourage updating vis-a-vis exit, it is to be expected that θ > 0 might be associated with a wider divergence of cross-industry turnover rates generated by g j . See Figure 2 . For θ = 10, the model entry rates range from 11.4% to 17.2%, which covers 67% of the range of entry and exit rates in the data. Thus, the model accounts for about 20%-70% of cross-industry variation in entry and exit rates, depending on θ.
Selection and obsolescence play very different roles depending on the value of θ. In the baseline, where θ = 0, selection plays very little role in the link between turnover and ISTC. Observe the leftmost column of Figure 3 , where the line separating regions of the type space corresponding to exit and updating depend very little on the value of g j . Similarly, in Table 8 , only a very small proportion of plants lies between the value of z * corresponding to g j = 4% and the values of z * corresponding to other values of g j . There are large differences in profitability between plants with different values of z and, when θ is low, z is the main determinant of which plants exit, whereas g j governs the timing of exit and of updating. On the other hand, for high values of θ the proportion of plants affected by the shift in z * is much larger, indicating that selection has a greater impact. When θ is high, because updating costs depend so much on g j , a change in g j also corresponds to an increase in the eventual costs of continuation, which further strengthens the selection effect.
By contrast, obsolescence is very important when θ = 0: observe the large differences in the dates at which plants update or exit depending on the value of g j , in the first column of Figure 3 . When θ = 10, these dates hardly vary with g j at all.
To sum up, high values of θ allow ISTC to account for the majority of industry differences in turnover. On the other hand, if we focus on the proportion of industry differences that can be explained by ISTC in the regressions, then the data are consistent with low values of θ. Thus, the model suggests that obsolescence (not selection) is the primary channel linking ISTC to turnover. θ = 0 θ = 5 θ = 10 g j = 0.01 0.8% 2.2% 2.9% g j = 0.04 0% 0% 0% g j = 0.08 0.3% 9.1% 32.9% Table 8 -Proportion of plants affected by the equilibrium change in z * relative to the baseline value of g j , which is 0.04.
Discussion
Structural Change
In the model, the rate of ISTC (g j ) is positively related to turnover rates when ISTC is embodied in the plant. In addition, the rate of disembodied technical change (ς j ) is not. This is partly related to the assumed preference structure, whereby industry shares are parametrically determined. This is consistent with the absence of a significant relationship between industry composition and entry costs found by Fisman and Sarria-Allende (2004) . At the same time, Ngai and Pissarides (2007) show that, when agents have CES preferences, a BGP is consistent with structural change whereby industries grow or shrink as a share of GDP depending on their rates of technical change.
Allowing for structural change leads to some new insights. Suppose as in Ngai and Pissarides (2007) that
Along a balanced growth path, changes in product prices offset technical change so that equation (14) still holds. Consequently, along a BGP, all the results of this paper continue to hold regarding the plant entry, exit and updating rules. However, if υ 6 = 1, the existence proof of Proposition (1) would no longer be able to take equilibrium sector shares as determined by ω i : shares would vary at every date. While hazard rates are equal for all cohorts, entry and exit rates will no longer be equal at all dates when there is structural change: entry will exceed exit in growing sectors. This is because the size of a firm of type (a, z) in industry j will not change over time: rather, it is the extensive margin (number of plants) that varies in transition.
be the mass of all plants in industry j at time t, so that
is the growth rate of plants in industry j.
Proposition 5 When preferences satisfy equation (22), a balanced growth path exists. Along this path,
Thus if υ < 1, the number of plants in industry i will shrink relative to industry j if and only if technical change (as measured by α k g i + ς i ) is more rapid in sector i. The opposite holds if υ > 1. If υ → 1 then there is no structural change.
Structural change could alter the ability of the model to account for cross-industry differences in entry and exit rates, for three reasons. One is that it allows differences in ς j to affect rates of entry and exit. If υ < 1, this might counteract the results if g i and ς i are positively correlated. Second, if υ < 1, then industries with high values of g i would themselves be industries that shrink, which would offset the relationship between entry and ISTC (although it might enhance the relationship with exit). The opposite holds if υ > 1. Finally, structural change implies that some industries will be skewed towards (or away from) younger plants, and the effect of these differences in composition on equilibrium exit rates is a priori unclear.
The impact of structural change on the model results can be assessed as follows. The model can be used to compute equilibrium behavior and hazard rates for each industry using the values of g j in Table 1 . Then, given a value for υ, equation (23) indicates the gap between entry and exit rates for each industry, relative to a benchmark. The benchmark used was the median value of α k g j + ς j . This yields the growth rate of the number of firms in each industry. Then, given equilibrium decisions rules, the law of motion for μ j t can be amended to account for the steadily increasing (or decreasing) mass of entrants over time in each industry. Industry rates of entry and exit can then be computed.
Values of ς j are drawn from the TFP growth estimates of Jorgenson, Ho, Samuels and Stiroh (2006) . 16 TFP and ISTC are uncorrelated in the data (−6.9%), suggesting that structural change is unlikely to affect results through variation in ς j except by adding "noise." Let υ = 0.3. 17 An issue that comes up is that the industry Computers and Electronic Products is an extreme outlier in terms of measured TFP (9% higher than the next highest industry), so that it was also an outlier in terms of structural change in the model (it shrinks by 5% more than the next fastest-shrinking industry). In the data this is not the case. This could be a measurement problem, or it could be that the output of this industry has different substitutability properties compared to other goods, or is experiencing structural change for different reasons over the period during which entry and exit rates were computed. Thus, results both with and without this industry are reported.
Model
With comp. Without comp.
Data Entry
Exit Entry Exit ETC 25% 37% * * 55% * * * 71% * * * (0.116) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) Entry 47% * * * 44% * * * 71% * * * 65% * * * (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) Exit 50% * * * 48% * * * 71% * * * 67% * * * (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) Table 9 -Correlations between model statistics and the data, under structural change. 16 argue that TFP measurements that do not account for ISTC may attribute a portion of ISTC to TFP. Hence, ς j is the residual in a regression of g j on the TFP measure of Jorgenson et al (2006) . This exercise excludes Rental Services and Other Services as the mapping between the industry classification used herein and that of Jorgenson et al (2006) was unclear. 17 Regressing α k g j + ς j on the difference between entry and exit rates reported in the data yielded a value of υ = 0.67, with a P-value of 0.112. If the industry Computers and Electronic Products was eliminated, then the value was υ = 0.89, with a P-value of 0.012. Ngai and Pissarides estimate in a 3-sector model that υ = 0.3. Out of all these values, the one that yields the largest divergences from stationary behavior is υ = 0.3. Table 9 . Excluding Computers and Electronic Products, turnover and ISTC are highly correlated even when there is structural change in the model. Thus, model results are robust to allowing for technology-induced structural change. Including Computers and Electronic Products, relationships are weaker but still mostly significant. Interestingly, the relationship with ISTC is weaker for entry than for exit when there is structural change, consistent with the fact that the empirical results are also generally weaker for entry than for exit.
Results are reported in
ISTC, Lumpiness and Exit
Not only does a higher rate of ISTC lead to earlier exit in the model: among plants that do not close, it also leads to earlier updating. This too has a significant impact on lifecycle dynamics, even though it does not lead to exit. Instead, it leads to a significant "spike" in investment at the establishment level.
It is known since at least Doms and Dunne (1998) that establishment level investment is "lumpy," i.e. characterized by periodic spikes. A "spike" is defined as a year in which investment expenditures exceed 30% of the establishment capital stock. These "spikes" are generally modeled using non-convex adjustment costs as, for example, in Khan and Thomas (2007) . In the model, such spikes may occur because of large changes in z t or because of updating but, in practice, all the spikes in the benchmark economy are due to updating as variance in z t is relatively low. Figure 4 shows that, in the benchmark economy (θ = 0), the frequency of investment lumps is positively related to the rate of ISTC. This is the case even when adjustment costs are increasing in g j , except when θ is so high that updating is actually discouraged by increases in g j . This is intuitive, if turnover and investment spikes both reflect significant changes in the technology in use at the establishment level. Thus, a positive relationship between the rate of ISTC and the frequency of investment spikes can be viewed as an independent prediction of the calibrated model, in addition to the positive relationship between ISTC and turnover.
To look at whether investment is disproportionately lumpy in industries with high rates of ISTC, "lumpiness" is measured using US data from Compustat. Over the period 1997-2004, identify whether each firm in the database experiences an investment "spike", as defined by Doms and Dunne (1998) . The index Lumpy for industry j is the proportion of firms in j that experienced any spikes at all over the period. 18 Compustat covers all publicly traded firms in the US so that, while not being a representative sample of US firms, firms in Compustat are likely to be financially unconstrained, so that their behavior reflects fundamentally technological factors. The unit of observation in Compustat is the firm, so that multi-unit firms may not display spikes due to aggregation. This may not be a concern as, to the extent that plants run by the same firm share z t -the definition of a firm, according to theories such as Faria (2007) and Hopenhayn (2007) -updating across these plants will likely be synchronized. Nonetheless, lumpiness is also computed for small firms only, as measured by employment. The disadvantage of the size-based measures is that there are very few firms in Compustat in some industries below certain size thresholds, so these measures are likely to be noisy. Table 11 shows that lumpiness is indeed positively related to turnover and to ISTC, in spite of all these caveats. Moreover, it is not related to the Jorgenson et al (2006) 
ISTC and Policy: An Application to entry costs
Section 2 reports that entry costs reduce turnover in industries in which ISTC is rapid, compared to industries in which it is sluggish. The same happens in the model economy. Raising the entry cost from one to two times GDP has two effects. First, it suppresses entry and exit in the model. Second, this drop is more pronounced for higher values of ISTC: when g j = 1% entry drops by 1.3%, whereas when g j = 8% entry drops by 1.8%. These changes are smaller than cross industry differences in turnover, so the model suggests that entry and exit rates should be decreasing in entry costs, and more compressed when entry is costly, yet still increasing in g j . This is exactly what we find in the data. A long-standing debate going back at least to Denison (1964) questions the policy relevance of ISTC. The debate relates to whether changes in investment rates over time are likely to change the distribution of capital quality enough to have significant macroeconomic impact: Denison (1964) suggests that changes in investment rates should little affect aggregate economic outcomes because of cross-industry differences in the rate of ISTC. In the model, policy can affect aggregates even in the absence of any fluctuations -because policy may affect the lifecycle dynamics of plants and the "business demography" of the economy. Figure 5 : Rate of entry and exit, depending on the rate of ISTC and on the level of entry costs as a percentage of GDP. The graph assumes that θ = 0. Flatter curves for higher entry costs are consistent with the empirically observed interaction between entry costs and ISTC.
For example, consider the role of entry costs in the model. Djankov et al (2002) find that entry costs appear negatively related to GDP levels across countries. The same may be true in the model economy: in Figure 5 , an increase in entry costs delays exit, so that a certain proportion of plants is operating with an older technology than otherwise.
From the US NIPA, compute the share of GDP made up by each of the 41 industries in the data set (which map into the demand parameters {ω j } j ). 19 Given the change in updating and exit behavior in each industry predicted by the model based on industry values of g j , the change in steady state aggregate GDP can be computed from a change in entry costs using these shares. Table 10 reports that entry costs can have a significant impact on GDP through the obsolescence channel. According to the Djankov et al (2002) measure, institutional entry costs range up to 80% of GDP per head (or d = 1.8) for countries in the sample, so entry costs can reduce steady state GDP by about 1% in the sample, or up to 1.4% in an economy with entry costs of around 200% of GDP per capita (or d = 3.0 as in Egypt or Vietnam). Thus, the effects of high entry costs on GDP through the obsolescence channel are of roughly the same magnitude as the effects of firing costs found by Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) in a one-sector model, suggesting that ISTC can be of policy-relevance even in the absence of fluctuations in investment rates. Interestingly, results do not depend on the value of θ: while the link between ISTC and adoption costs is important for turnover, it does not appear to be important for policy, at least as far as entry costs are concerned.
Entry cost d θ 1.0 1.25 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 0 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 5 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -1.5 10 0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.8 -1.2 -1.6 Table 10 -Percentage change in GDP due to entry costs, relative to GDP in the benchmark economy.
Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, cross-industry differences in entry and exit rates remain largely unexplained. Second, vintage capital models generally have a strong prediction: that, if technical progress is somehow embodied in the plant, it should be positively related to rates of entry and exit. The paper concentrates upon the case of technical progress in the production of the capital goods used by each industry, finding support for this prediction. The paper thus draws a relationship between entry, exit and ISTC, a factor that among others have found to account for a significant portion of economic growth. At the same time, there may be forms of technical change that are embodied in assets other than capital per se. For example, it would be interesting to see how far one can explain industry differences in entry and exit rates using differences in research or knowledge intensity.
Proof of Lemmata 1, 2 and 3. Notice that production is a static decision. Thus
so, plugging in this result yields
. Then, optimal capital use is
Now, given that r j x = r j0 e −g j τ , this becomes π (z t , x t ) = (p jt A jt z t )
Suppose labor is the numeraire. Then the value of an entrant must be constant over time, so that, if φ j is the growth rate of p jt then
Let a = t − τ be the age of the establishment's technology (with respect to the frontier). Then, 33) or, setting γ j = α k g j 1−αn−α k and s t = z
Thus, here, establishment profits depend only on z and on the distance from the industry frontier. With this under our belts, we can write the establishment's problem recursively, impose condition (8) for industry j, and divide through by B j to obtain value function (15), which does not depend on the date, only on industry parameters.
j . Now in a BGP it must be that their income is growing. So, for constant labor, need c −κ t w t /p to be constant over time, so g p = g −κ c g w . Setting w = 1 to be the numeraire, then g p = g −κ c . Recall that p jt drops over time at rate −φ j . Given a constant mass of establishments μ * j , real output grows at rate −φ j , so this equation holds provided c j0 = s c ω j p j0 . Now p j0 is given by the entry condition (8), so shares of consumption are given and
so real consumption grows at a constant rate κ P j φ j ω j , and the share of each type of good is constant and given by p j0 . Notice that the output of each establishment is not linear in p j0 (it is strictly convex) so that for any p j0 there is a unique mass of establishments in that industry that can satisfy demand for a given value of consumption spending s c . (which pins down the entry rates ε j ). Conversely, given a total mass of establishments s c and the distribution of establishments over industries is given. Preferences are such that a constant share of income is invested, so it remains to check that income is constant (in units of labor) and that the labor market clears. Turning to the budget constraint, income in (in units of labor) is constant provided the measure over establishments is constant. Income is linear in the total number of establishments. Hence, the number of establishments that clears the labor market is the equilibrium number, which leads to equilibrium values of income, spending, and all other variables as above. Such a number exists because labor supply is inelastic -see Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) . Proof of Proposition 4. As ∆ → 0, the establishment's problem approaches the continuous time problem
Although this is a continuous time problem, it can be approached using discrete time recursive methods. The first order conditions for T given W are
so that T is decreasing in W . Suppose W is the payoff assuming that γ j = 0. That is strictly larger than V j (0, s) (1 − E), so the true solution (if it exists) necessarily has T larger than T * * , which is the solution to that problem. Now consider the same problem subject to T ∈ [T * * , ∞), and write the Bellman equation
where B is the Bellman operator. Blackwell's conditions are satisfied (because T is bounded) so B is a contraction and the problem has a unique solution. Let T * be the solution. Its derivative with respect to g satisfies
Solving for W,
and
So T g < 0 if and only if
As g → 0, T → ∞ so this becomes
where c ij is a constant that depends on initial conditions in each industry. Thus, taking logs and time-differencing,
Thus if υ < 1, industry i will shrink relative to industry j if and only if technical change (as measured by α k g i + ς i ) is more rapid in sector i. The opposite holds if υ > 1. If υ = 1 then there is no structural change and we are in the case studied earlier. Existence follows from Ngai and Pissarides (2007), which pins down the paths for labor allocations and hence for μ i t (M i t ) .
A.2 Data Appendix
Entry and exit rates are computed from Eurostat. An observation in Eurostat is an "enterprise," defined as "the smallest combination of legal units that is an organisational unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, especially for the allocation of its current resources.
An enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations. An enterprise may be a sole legal unit." (Council Regulation (EEC), No. 696/93, Section III A of 15.03.1993). Birth rate: number of enterprise births in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t. Death rate: number of enterprise deaths in the reference period (t) divided by the number of enterprises active in t. Turnover rate: the sum of the birth rate and the death rate. Cummins and Violante (2002) construct quality-adjusted capital goods prices for 26 types of equipment goods types. The industry rage of ISTC is based on aggregating these prices by industry, using the BEA industry-level capital flow tables, divided by the NIPA consumption and services deflator. The measure can be constructed with or without structures, following Cummins and Violante (2002) in using the official price series for structures. The empirical work was repeated using only data on equipment, finding generally similar results, slightly stronger for the cross-industry comparisons, and slightly weaker for the differences-in-differences regressions.
The industry classification of the BEA input-output tables (which are used to construct the ISTC measure) and by Eurostat do not exactly coincide. The 41 industries reported represent the join of the two classification systems.
A.3 Model with capital goods industries
Observe that the structure of capital accumulation in this model resembles that of , except that there are distinct capital stocks for each sector.
There is an additional difference between the two models. In there is only one technology for converting consumption into investment, which improves over time. In this model, however, that is not the case: establishments have a choice over this technology, whereas the set of available technologies expands over time.
An interpretation of the capital accumulation structure is as follows. Suppose there are N K types of capital good. Each industry j uses an industry-specific capital composite based on these N K goods. The frontier productivity of each capital type k ∈ N K improves over time. Thus, at any date, one unit of the numeraire may be used to produce A kτ = A k0 e ς k τ units of capital of type k, vintage τ . Let q j τt equal new units of capital for use in sector j of vintage τ , so that k j τ,t+1 = q j τt + e −δ∆ k j τt .
New capital for use in industry j is a composite of the N k types of capital good:
Thus, a plant in industry j is built of a mix of different capital goods. Then households maximize 
where p τ jt is the shadow price of the capital composite used by industry j, of vintage τ. The FOC are ω jk p τ jt q τ jt = p τ kt y τ kjt (53) so that the share of spending on each type is ω jk . So, if total spending on new capital is X, then y τ kjt = ω jk X p τ kt and we have
Over time, or comparing across vintages,
so that the growth rate in the relative price of composite capital used by any industry is the average of the growth rate in the prices of the goods used, weighted by their shares. This is exactly how the relative price series are constructed in the empirical section of this paper, following Cummins and Violante (2002) . Under this interpretation, it is straightforward to show that the relative price of frontier capital of each type k ∈ N K declines at rate ς k , so that
Thus, ISTC represents nothing other than increases in the efficiency of capital good production. Alternatively, the model economy could be written to explicitly contain N k capitalproducing industries, although not doing so significantly simplifies the exposition.
Suppose that there are J consumption industries as before, and also N k capitalproducing industries. In each industry there is a disembodied productivity frontier A jt = A j0 e ς j t , and firms may produce goods using any technology A jτ ≤ A jt . There is a price p τ jt for each good, that may vary by vintage τ . For consumption goods, at any date, for any two vintages τ and τ 0 , prices will be proportional to A jτ and A jτ 0 . As a result, consumers will not purchase goods of any vintage τ < t. For capital goods, on the other hand, this is not necessarily the case (as before), because firms are temporarily locked into their capital vintage. Regardless of which vintage a capital goods firm chooses to produce, however, it will make the same profits, because free entry implies that A jτ p τ jt = A jτ 0 p τ 0 jt , so marginal revenue products are the same regardless of the vintage produced.
The existence proof then needs to change in two ways. First, g j must be derived from ς k for the capital-producing industries. This involves some simple matrix algebra. Second, for given aggregate spending, we know how much spending there will be on capital goods of each type from the NIPA. Since this is linear in the number of firms, this does not complicate the proof.
One last difference concerns the reversibility of investment. If capital goods depreciate more slowly than the rate at which demand for them decreases over time, then the equilibrium time paths of capital goods prices may not be exponential if investment is not reversible. For these time paths to hold, investment in capital goods must be reversible according to the same marginal rates of transformation used to create them. Thus, the model with capital goods amounts to assuming that (a) investment is reversible, and (b) firms may produce any vintage of their good.
